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William Rowe has offered one of the most simple and 
convincing evidential arguments from evil by arguing that the 
existence of gratuitous evil in our world serves as strong evidence 
against the claim that God exists. Stephen J. Wykstra attempts to 
defeat this evidential argument from evil by denying the plausibility 
of Rowe's claim that there are gratuitous evils in the world. Wykstra 
sets up an epistemological test that he refers to as CORNEA, and 
he proceeds to demonstrate that Rowe's inference to his existential 
claim is unjustified in light of our particular epistemic situation. 
Specifically, this inference is unjustified because compensating 
goods that would be "connected to" any given evil lack what 
Wykstra calls 'seeability.' Without seeability, it is illicit to infer 
the nonexistence of an object simply from the fact that we cannot 
detect it, and thus Rowe is denied justification for his first premise. 
Wysktra's principle defense of the non-seeability of compensating 
goods rests on an analogy comparing children and parents to 
humans and God. 11 will show that Wykstra's conclusion regarding 
the seeability of compensating goods is unjustified given this 
analogy. Without justification for the claim that some compensating 
goods lack seeability, Wykstra's defeater crumbles. 
First I need to reconstruct Wykstra's criticism in order to 
demonstrate the crucial role of seeability in his defeater, and then 
I will criticize his application of the parent analogy. Rowe's original 
evidential argument from evil begins with the existential claim 
that gratuitous evil exists, then notes that if God exists then there 
will not be any gratuitous evil, and concludes via modus tollens 
that God does not exist.2 Wykstra converts Rowe's existential claim 
concerning gratuitous evils into the logically-equivalent claim 
regarding the existence of compensating goods for some evils. 3 In 
other words, Wykstra demands that Rowe defend the claim that 
there are no compensating goods for some evils. Rowe ' s 
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"Nosecum" argument does so, according to Wykstra, by A) noting 
that we do not see any compensating goods, B) then claiming that 
there appear to be no compensating goods, and finally C) 
concluding that there are no compensating goods. 4 Wykstra 
endorses Chisolm's principle of credulity which states that "if 
something appears to be a certain way, then, provided there is no 
counterevidence, it is reasonable for us to believe that X is that 
way," 5 and so he accepts Rowe's move from (B) to (C). What he 
rejects is Rowe's inference from (A) "we see no compensating 
goods" to (B) "there appears to be no compensating goods." 
This is a strange form of argumentation, as Wykstra seems to 
indicate that appearance states can fail to be justified while 
justification is a notion that is usually reserved for beliefs.6 Both 
(A) and (B) are basically appearance states while only (C) is a 
belief state. I'm not sure that Rowe would accept Wykstra's odd 
reformulation of his argument, but I think that this oddity, while 
confusing, is not ultimately fatal to Wykstra's critique. All he must 
generate is a defeater that will block the conclusion normally 
allowed by the principle of credulity, and he thinks that CORNEA 
provides just that. Going forward I will continue to use Wkystra's 
terminology and formulation, while noting that his argument is 
readily converted into an argument for a defeater that will provide 
counterevidence blocking the move from the appearance state (B) 
to the belief state (C) via the principle of credulity.7 
In order to justify his move from (A) to (B), Wykstra demands 
that Rowe submit his inference to a test regarding the conditions 
of reasonable epistemic access (CORNEA). CORNEA is Wykstra's 
heuristic tool for evaluating 'appears' claims: 
CORNEA says that a situation of seeing no X justifies one's 
claiming "it appears there is no X" only if it is reasonable for 
one to believe that X is something to which we would likely 
have "epistemic access" in the situation....CORNEA says that 
Rowe's noseeum situation justifies his appears claim only if it 
is reasonable for Rowe to believe that a God-justifying good 
for the fawn's suffering would likely be "seeable. "8 
"Seeability" is thus the crucial issue. If Rowe can demonstrate 
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the subjunctive claim that compensating goods would be seeable 
given our epistcmic condition, then he is licensed to establish his 
"appears" claim. If, however, we are justified in concluding that 
compensating goods would not be seeable given our epistcmic 
condition (or if we are unable to make any justified conclusion 
regarding the seeability of goods), then Rowe is prohibited from 
his "appears" claim, and his evidential argument fails. 
The determination of whether or not something has seeability 
is thus the crucial element in Wykstra's critique. He employs what 
he calls the Adjunct Principle to clarify the epistemic conclusion 
of seeability: 
If Rowe is made aware of good reasons for thinking that God-
justifying goods would lack seeability, then conditionally (i.e. 
unless Rowe defeats these with other considerations), it is not 
reasonable for Rowe to believe that these goods would be 
seeable.9 
The central issue at hand, then, is whether or not, given our 
epistemic condit ion, we have good reasons to think that 
compensating goods would be seeable. 
Wykstra concludes that we are justified in believing that 
compensating goods (if they existed) would lack seeability, and 
he supports this conclusion with what he calls the parent analogy: 
Given what we independently know of our cognitive limits, I 
[suggest] that the vision of such a being might well be to ours, 
as a parent's is to that of a one-month-old human infant.... [and 
regarding compensating goods] that we should discern most of 
them seems about as likely as that a one-month-old should 
discern most of his parent's purposes for those pains they allow 
him to suffer—which is to say, it is not likely at all.1 0 
Prima facie, Wykstra's analogy is useful. If God exists in 
traditional form, then his understanding and knowledge would far 
surpass that of any finite creation. And just as surely, a parent has 
an understanding and knowledge that far surpasses that of an infant. 
Wykstra ends the analogy here with the conclusion that just as it is 
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unsurprising that a parent have knowledge of compensating goods 
that the child cannot fathom, so too it is unsurprising that God 
would have knowledge of compensating goods which we cannot 
fathom. 
The general structure of the parentxhild :: God:man analogy 
is instructive. But I think, pace Wykstra, that the analogy can be 
extended to defend Rowe's inference from (A) to (B). It seems to 
me that Rowe can establish a reasonable justification for the 
seeability of compensating goods by reformulating Wykstra's 
parent analogy. Contra Wykstra, this comparison provides at least 
some justification for the claim that compensating goods would 
be seeable. 
Here is one suggestion as to how Rowe might use the parent 
analogy to defend his claim that there appear to be no compensating 
goods for evils in our world. The analogy would be more 
appropriate if we considered the relationship between a kind and 
loving parent and his child. God is omni-benevolent, so this 
alteration is, if anything, an improvement. A loving parent will 
always want the best for his child, and at times, this means that the 
child must endure some pain, hardship or suffering in order to 
achieve some compensating good. Because such suffering is 
difficult and intrinsically evil, a loving parent will do all he can to 
ensure that the child is able to "see" the compensating good that 
requires the suffering in question. A parent who is able to ensure 
that his child can "see" the compensating good but who instead 
obscures the good from the child's recognition is not loving at all 
but cruel. Loving parents, then, ensure that their children can see 
the compensating goods whenever this is possible. 
Wykstra might object that children (especially infants), 
regardless of how much the parent would like the child to see 
them, cannot "see" compensating goods. For example, a young 
child who must undergo months of chemotherapy cannot just "see" 
the compensating benefit to his terrible suffering. I think that this 
objection is on the right track. But suppose we take another look 
at the parent analogy. Notice that when a loving parent is unable 
to ensure that the child can "see" the compensating good, he makes 
every effort to explain the compensating good to the child, and he 
continually assures his child that this compensating good exists. 
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When a young child requires a painful inoculation, the loving parent 
sits him down and explains the reasoning behind the injection. 
Even though the child cannot "see" the benefit of being vaccinated, 
his parent takes great measures to assure him that the pain is 
necessary for some greater end. I think it reasonable to conclude 
that when a loving parent cannot ensure that his child can "see" 
the compensating good, he provides sound assurances that this 
sort of good exists and that the present suffering is not gratuitous. 
Wykstra might agree with the foregoing analysis and yet raise a 
new objection. Recall that the original analogs are a human parent 
and an infant. Parents cannot communicate to an infant the sort of 
information that we have been considering. This is because no 
matter how much the parent may want to communicate with the 
infant, the infant 's mental abi l i t ies effectively prohibi t 
communication. Perhaps, due to the vast difference between our 
mental abilities, God is simply unable to comfort and assure us in 
the ways that I have suggested. Or, alternatively, perhaps God has 
communicated this assurance, but we just haven't understood it. I 
take it that this latter objection isn't very convincing, as I can 
imagine no way of defending it that will not preclude our having 
understood God's communication in the first place. 
But consider the former option—perhaps our mental abilities 
are so deficient that God cannot communicate this sort of 
information to us. Again Wykstra's parent analogy requires some 
adjustments. It is certainly true that human parents can't fully 
communicate with infants (though they can interact with infants— 
e.g. comforting them, nurturing them, etc.). But as a theist, I assume 
that Wykstra believes that God communicates with his creation— 
especially humans. The Christian God, at least, has communicated 
all sorts of things to us, including moral principles, promises, 
prophecies, etc. In short, it won't do for Wykstra to deny that 
communication concerning the existence of compensating goods 
is possible. It appears that the parent analogy must be refined again 
to reflect the relationship between a loving parent and a child who 
is old enough to understand basic communication. But if we revise 
the analogy in this way, the most recent objection (that 
communication on the topic of suffering and compensating goods 
is impossible) fails. 
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In short, the parent analogy, which serves as Wykstra's sole 
justification for his conclusion that compensating goods would lack 
"seeability," turns out to provide Rowe with precisely the justification 
that his argument needs. If he can extend the parent analogy in the 
directions that I have suggested, then Rowe can meet the standards of 
the Adjunct Principle by demonstrating that, given theism, it is likely 
that we would know about the existence of compensating goods, and 
his inference will then meet the test of CORNEA by showing that 
compensating goods have a high level of seeability. With the CORNEA 
test satisfied, Rowe is licensed to conclude that seeing no compensating 
goods (A) can justify the claim that there are no compensating goods 
(C). With rational support for the claim that no compensating goods 
exist, Rowe has justification for the belief that gratuitous evils exist, 
and his evidential argument against the existence of God is a success. 
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